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Abstract
If it is true, as Bergson claimed, that the universe is the sum
of images (less than “objective” things but more than
“subjective” representations), and if it is correct, as Deleuze
said, that this hypothesis bears direct consequences for our
understanding of the cinematographic art, then the analysis of
cinematographic images and, especially, of the
cinematographic images of the body (this living part of matter,
this incarnated form of consciousness) can provide not only
interesting aesthetic comments about specific directors and
films, but also a philosophical understanding of the diverse
modes of the sensible incarnation of human bodies.
Interestingly enough, the more we believe in the truth of
aesthetic images,  the more we believe in the ontological
reality of the body, that is, the more does ontological reality
become, essentially, “imaginal.”
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1. Introduction:  the body of the image and the image of
the body
In Matière et mémoire, Bergson defines the world as a sum of
images: The world can neither be defined by the mere
representation of subjects nor by the pure materiality of
objects.[1]
In Proust et les signes, Deleuze says, almost in
the same sense:  “Neither things nor minds exist,
they are only bodies: astral bodies, vegetal
bodies.”[2]
The relation between bodies and images is the main topic of
this paper. Its metaphysical thesis is that the propositions
“there is nothing but images” and “there is nothing but bodies”
are ontologically similar. (This is, I think, a direct theoretical
consequence of Deleuze’s books on cinema.[3]) In terms of
aesthetics, the hypothesis is that the ontological link between
image and body can allow us to establish a relation between
the theory of sensibility developed by specific philosophers and
the practice of cinema achieved by specific movie makers.
We will thus explore the relation between Plato’s definition of
sensibility and Bresson’s movies, the relation between
Descartes’ definition of the passion of the soul and the North
American movies that have been influenced by the Actors
Studio method, the relation between French phenomenology
and eroticism in cinema, and the relation between Deleuze’s
theory of the break-up of the sensor-motor schema and the
emergence of memory as the main topic of narratives in
contemporary films. I will conclude by affirming that the
virtualization of corporality in recent action movies may be the
ultimate testimony of the imaginal nature of aesthetic realities.
But first, a brief presentation of Bergson’s concept of image
will provide the metaphysical basis of this study of the
representation of the body in films.
2. The metaphysic of the image and Bergson’s theory of
knowledge
According to Bergson, the world is neither the sum of
interacting things nor the sum of conscious representations but
the totality of actual and virtual images. A world of pure
objects would be a world defined by the sum of actions and
reactions of particles, a world with an exact symmetry
between the production and the annihilation of particles would
turn it into non-existence by destroying itself each time it
appears. The notion that the world could not be the pure sum
of physical actions and reactions led Descartes to think that
only God can sustain the stability of the world by creating it at
each moment.[4] A world of pure subjects would be a world
defined by the integral of individual representations. It would
be a world where the peculiar world views of each subject
would amount, for each subject, to the totality of the world
and thus to a world where communication would be
impossible. The notion that the world could not simply be the
integral of individual representations led Leibniz to imagine a
pre-established harmony that can relate and connect the
monads insulated into their representations. I find that
Bergson’s philosophy proposed the most original and
convincing solution to these two distinct problems.
First, if the world is not the pure sum of actions and reactions
of particles, it is because between action and reaction stands
an interval of time whose concrete embodiment in the universe
corresponds to the emergence of living bodies.[5] If the world
cannot be reduced to the pure actuality of actions and
reactions, this is because the universe does not only exist in
the present but extends also into the past. There is not only
matter but memory – and memory is not related simply to
human beings but to life in general. It is virtually coextensive
with the whole universe.[6] What we call “laws of nature” are
neither an expression of the obedience of things to God’s rules
nor the result of a universal construction of the human mind
but the manifestation of the power of the past, of the force of
universal memory by which the modalities of the connections
between particles survive these particles.
Second, if there is no way to assimilate the world through the
integral of all the individual representations, this is because of
this dual nature, to be both actual and virtual in terms of
images. This is also because among all these images  only one
image is so highly specific that it makes all of the other
images gravitate around it, namely the body. What is
particular about the body is that it is neither a thing nor a
representation. It is not a mere piece of matter because it is
living; it is not a pure representation because it is acting. In
this regard, the body perfectly embodies Bergson’s conception
of the image, which is half actual and half virtual, half matter
and half memory.
3. Categories of the cinematographic image of the body
If the body is itself an image and a central image—an image
that organizes the distribution of spatial-images according to
its practical needs and the stratification of time-images or
memories according to its degree of attention to reality—this
means that to analyze the image of the body in films is not
simply dealing with aesthetics but also dealing with
gnosiology. If the world is made by images, then there is no
separation between phenomena and noumena. However, the
fact that there is no separation between phenomena and
noumena does not mean that an empirical knowledge of reality
is sufficient. Empirical knowledge of reality can only grasp the
actual dimension of the image and is otherwise unable to
grasp its virtual dimension. If philosophy, art, and religion are
still needed and not simply science, this is because their task
is precisely to disclose this virtuality, that is, in general, to
disclose the temporality of images and, in particular, of  body-
images.
Bodies are neither objects nor ideas, and images are neither
things nor representations. Bodies are spatial-temporal images
produced by the cinema of the world while cinematographic
images are actual-virtual bodies produced by the world of
cinema.[7]
There is an ontological link between the way the body is
affected in its engagement with “reality,” expressed by the
different incarnations of sensibility, and the way the image of
the body can be displayed in its involvement with “memory,”
expressed by the different epiphanies of “imagination.” Reality
and memory are nothing but the two faces, actual and virtual,
of images. Moreover, it is only by convention that we name
actual images “bodies” and virtual bodies “images,” since both
of them have the same ontological status.
The different aspects of the representation of bodies in films
can thus illustrate the different modalities of the expression of
bodies in reality and also the different philosophical
understandings of the notion of sensibility.[8] Interestingly, as
we will see, the more we believe in the truth of aesthetic
images, the more we believe in the ontological reality of the
body. This ontological reality is essentially, as Henry Corbin
says, “imaginal.”[9]
4. Plato and Bresson:  the refusal of sensibility and the
hand of the devil
The question of the representation of the Sensible in Plato’s
philosophy is a highly complicated issue because it involves
two different problems at the same time, the aesthetic
problem of the value of imitation and the metaphysical
problem of the definition of the Sensible. Plato seems to have
addressed these two problems in the same way. In Plato’s
Phaedo, the body is seen as an obstacle from which the soul
strives to be freed and in Gorgias, Plato defines the body as
the grave in which the living soul is buried.[10],[11] In Plato’s
Republic, art is banned from the city because it seems to
arouse feelings that disturb public order, while in the Laws,
Plato reintegrates art insofar as it contributes to the social
order and provides the emotive basis of the sentiment of
belonging to the City.[12]
This dual denegation of the Sensible and of art supports itself.
The sensible is an imitation of reality; the artistic process of
mimesis induces a deformation of what it represents. Since
the Sensible is a corrupted copy of the Intelligible, the result
of the aesthetic process of mimesis is the product of an
artificial copy of distorted reality. Art is not only vain but also
dangerous. The more perfect the imitation is, the more
treacherous it becomes. By providing a beautiful
representation of the external world, the artist lures us into
believing that because the world outside is really attractive, it
is also real.
In Plato’s philosophy, Art and Body both suffer from the
denegation of sensibility. Sensibility is what chains us to
reality, through bodily desires, and prevents us from escaping
its illusory appearance, because of the seductions of art. Such
a negative perception of sensibility comes from the fact that
sensibility is associated with passivity. Pathos means both
feeling and passivity. In Greek culture, as demonstrated by
Foucault in his study on sexuality, passivity is associated with
inferior social status while activity is valued as emblematic of
masculine aristocracy.[13] Furthermore, Plato’s refusal to
consider the artistic representation of the Sensible as a
legitimate way to disclose truth originates from the absence of
epistemic value associated with sense data.[14] The criterion
for the validity of soul’s judgment is not sense data but
intelligible ideas.[15]
In this Platonist perspective, the question of the mode of
existence of cinematographic bodies seems paradoxical. What
is a cinematographic representation of a body when it is based
on the dual denegation of bodily sensibility and artistic
imitation? Actually, the denouncing of world illusions and the
despising of bodily sensibility can be a source of aesthetic
inspiration. It can be said about Robert Bresson, for example,
that he is the most Platonic of movie directors. Among his
films, L’argent (1983) is the most representative of this
Platonic stance.
The cinematographic expression of bodies in Bresson’s films,
L’argent in particular, (see pictures 1 to 4), is clearly based on
a Platonist opposition between the hand and the face. The
hand is immoral, led only by greed and desire. Hands know
only one thing: how to take and catch whatever they can,
wherever they can, however they can, regardless of from
where it comes and from how it has been picked up. In
Bresson’s movie, human hands embody animal, preconscious
knowledge, and are limited to two actions, grasping money or
causing death. The face stands in opposition to the hand, in
that the face means salvation, redemption from the immorality
and sheer egoism of the hand. The hand is harmful while the
face is harmless. The tactile sensibility of the hand is unable to
reach a moral understanding of the world.[16] The same
actions can be repeated over and over again without any
conscionable awareness of what is going on.
Conversely, the visual awareness of the face restitutes a
subjective control of the body’s implacable determinism. When
the face arises, it sheds light on the negative spiral of deeds
that trap us. It illuminates our life and changes it dramatically.
The face that arises on our path is the face of another person,
the face of a loved one. From the bars of the jail of the world,
a face reconnects us to ourselves, to our true spiritual nature.
However, such a redemptory face emerges only at the end of
the film. The story of redemption is off-screen in the same
way that Plato’s Ideas are beyond the sensible world.
 
5. Descartes and Actors-Studio movies:  functional
bodies and theatrical emotions
In Descartes’ metaphysics, the body is nothing but a piece of
the extensive substance, completely distinct from the thinking
substance.[17] Being a part of the extensive substance, the
body can be thoroughly analyzed as it relates to the scientific
principles of classical mechanics, ruling the physical
organization of the world. Consequently, the body is a
machine.[18] The body machine remains external to the
subject. It is a piece of space associated with the mind. The
body machine has no clear perception of itself; therefore,
perceptions and sensations are very often misleading.[19]
Conversely, we have direct knowledge of our mind’s cognitive
operations. The mind’s self-reflectiveness implies, not only
that we think, but also that we know that we think and cannot
think without knowing this.
However, if sensory perceptions induce judgmental mistakes,
we cannot complain about the flawed nature of our body, since
the union of our mind with our body has been established by
God. The deficiency lies, rather, in our will. The body is a
functional tool given to the mind to realize its will. Our moral
education consists in domesticating body movements and
emotional reactions to the will of our mind.[20] In this respect,
Descartes’ theory of the passions of the soul should
complement his theory of the body machine. Passions are the
point of contact between the two substances of the thinking
mind and the extensive body.[21]
Descartes’ Passions of the Soul has opened a new path for the
scientific study of human characters defined by the emotive
characteristics commanding bodily behaviors. In this respect,
Descartes follows an old Aristotelian intuition. “It is possible,”
Aristotle writes, “to infer character from features, if it is
granted that the body and the soul are changed together by
the natural affections: I say ‘natural,’ for though perhaps by
learning music a man has made some change in his soul, this
is not one of those affections which are natural to us; rather I
refer to passions and desires when I speak of natural
emotions.”[22] In Descartes’ time, the study of human
passions through depictions of facial features was particularly
endorsed by painters like Charles Le Brun (picture 5), who
attempted to create a catalog of human facial expressions to
realistically represent human emotions.[23] In his work, joy,
hate, surprise, and fear express not only different states of
being of the body but also different modes of expression of the
soul. Nowadays, the scientific study of facial emotional
expressions constitutes an important field of research for
behavioral psychology (picture 6).[24]
Directors such as Kazan (in On the Waterfront, 1954; picture
7), Fuller (in Shock Corridor, 1963; picture 8), and Lumet
have provided the cinematographic equivalent of such
Cartesian behavioral representations of feelings. The
cinematographic function of emotion is to stimulate empathy
and induce emotional immersion. The actor’s faculty to
express feelings rooted in his or her own experience is the
condition for the emotional involvement of the spectator into
the cinematographic narrative.
 
6. Phenomenology and the erotic of mysticism
Phenomenology seems to have provided the most fecund
understanding of the mode of existence of bodies, overcoming
its persistent denegation by classic continental philosophers,
from Plato to Descartes. Because the body was viewed as the
non-thinking part of a human being, there was no
philosophical need to understand its inherently non-conceptual
nature. The phenomenology of Husserl paved the way for a
new understanding of the body as the subject of human
individuation. The body (Leib) became the substance-subject
(Subjekt-Leib) of the feeling faculty (empfindendes Dinge).
The phenomenological experience, since it provides the
capacity of feeling life itself (leiblicher Körper), hinges on the
living body (Leibkörper). Phenomenological experience
connects to the body mostly by an inward, internal feeling of
the self.[25]
In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, the relation of the subject
to the world is mediated by the bodily connection to others
through their bodies. “It is through their bodies that I
perceived as a soul the soul of the other.”[26] Through his
concept of chiasm, articulating the body of the spirit as the
spirit of the body, Merleau-Ponty philosophically goes further
than Husserl with his recognition of the body’s conceptual
value.[27] Husserl emphasizes the primacy of visual
perception and draws a distinction between visual and tactile
sensations. Visual perception implies the possibility of seeing
without being seen or, more exactly, the possibility to mediate
and differ this interaction.[28] But Merleau-Ponty does not
prioritize visual perception and bodily proprioception. In
physical contact, the body becomes, at the same time, seeing
and seen, touching and touched. Phenomenology is actually
unique in giving the possibility to think the body erotically. For
Merleau-Ponty, erotic feelings and sexual pleasure embody the
paradigmatic understanding of the body as both source and
receptacle of inner feelings where the self and the other fuse
into each other:[29] “… The sexual is our way (since we are
flesh, our carnal way) of living our relationship with
others.”[30]
This is the difference between Michel Henry’s and Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology. Michel Henry’s phenomenology is
derived from the medieval Christian mystical tradition (Master
Eckhart); the glorification of sexuality stands in opposition to
it. Michel Henry distinguishes clearly between his own concept
of incarnation and sexual eroticism. Instead of being
paradigmatic of an accomplished relationship, sexual
intercourse reveals the limitations of empirical mundane
bodies, along with their incapacity to go beyond their
“objective” nature as things among things. Sexual bodies are
not pure affective subjects but mere animal objects.[31]
Michel Henry’s concept of incarnation denotes a body deprived
of material/spatial features. Flesh means body minus extended
materiality; auto-affection means proprioception minus
physiology; incarnation means subjective body minus the
world.[32],[33] “Not only is the body not an object amongst
others, but it is not an object at all, i.e., it does not belong, in
any way, to the order of exteriority.”[34]
Different again is Jean-Luc Marion’s conception of
phenomenological sensibility, since it denotes a subjective
form of experience that is “erotic” by definition. However,
Marion’s eroticism differs from Merleau-Ponty’s account of
sexual intercourse. His eroticism is the unconditioned gift of
love, determining any meaningful subjective relationship to
the world.[35] Marion’s eroticism differs equally from Michel
Henry “mystical” auto-affection. While Michel Henry promotes
an iconoclast understanding of sensibility deprived from any
outward form of representation, for Jean-Luc Marion the icon
or figural image mediates the passage from the visible to the
invisible.[36] The icon  itself is not sacred but  points to a
transcendental reality, the radical remoteness of which comes
closer through its visual mediation.[37]
These two interpretations of the mystic and erotic aspects of
the phenomenological body are not contradictory. Indeed,
Bataille famously advocated that the difference between sexual
and mystical relationships only lies in the difference of their
object. They share an identical subjective mode of
affection.[38] Actually, in the descriptions of the mystic-
ecstatic state by Christian writers like Saint Teresa of Ávila,
sexual metaphors abound.[39] Bernini’s Ecstasy of Saint
Teresa, (1647-1652,  picture 9) is also an eloquent example of
such a contamination of mysticism by sexuality in that the
facial expression of orgasm provides the most adequate
metaphor to convey the disruptive feeling of the manifestation
of a transcendent power in the body.
A cinematographic equivalent of the mode of existence of
phenomenological bodies will focus on displaying subjectively
intense feelings. The event of a body confronted with a
corporal affect exceeding its mundane possibility of incarnation
constitutes the most important part of the visual narrative of
films affected by a phenomenological understanding of
sensibility.[40] Films such as The passion of Joan of Arc
(1928), by Carl Theodor Dreyer (picture 10), The Silence
(1963), by Ingmar Bergman (picture 11), and In the Realm of
Senses (1978), by Nagisa Oshima (picture 12) all participate in
a phenomenological mode of presentation of bodies. Death,
transcendence, and sexuality are united through the single
thread of pure affection and culminate in the “ravishment of
the face.” [41]
 
 7. Non-acting bodies and non-bodily actions:  the break
of “sensory-motor links”
Deleuze built his philosophy of cinema around an historical
distinction between two periods and two styles of cinema.
Classic cinema explores the diverse aspects of moving images
(Movement-Image). Modern cinema explores the different
potentialities of memorial images (Time-Image).[42] The
conceptual articulation between these two kinds of images
comes from the pivotal notion of a “sensory-motor” action
scheme derived from Bergson and adapted to the study of
cinema. “Bergson distinguishes two kinds of ‘recognition.’
Automatic or habitual recognition (the cow recognizes grass, I
recognize my friend Peter) works by extension …. The second
mode of recognition, attentive recognition, is very different.
Here, I abandon the extending of my perception, I cannot
extend it ….  In the first case, we had, we perceived, a
sensory-motor image from the thing. In the other case, we
constitute a pure optical (and sound) image of the thing, we
make a description.”[43] Cinematographic representations
conducted inside the Movement-Image framework rest on the
depiction of actions and the emotions they excite.
Cinematographic representations conducted inside the Time-
Image framework go with the elegiac or tragic contemplation
of events.
The mode of presentation of the body in the Time-Image
framework overcomes the dilemma between the (Cartesian)
behavioral and mechanistic representation of bodies and its
(phenomenological) erotic epochal sublimation. The body is
neither an actual given thing defined by reflexes and habits
nor a transcendent flesh. It is a surface where memories come
to be reflected. In this context, from Alain Resnais’ Je
t’aime, je t’aime (1968; picture 13) to Christopher Nolan’s
Memento (2000; picture 14), and from Kubrick’s A Space
Odyssey (1968;  picture 15) to Terence Malik’s The Tree of Life
(2011), the cinematographic expression of the body is devoted
to the expression of the links between body and time:
 memories or amnesia, elegy of time past or anticipation of
coming times. Cinematographic art actualizes the potentialities
of Malraux’s “virtual museum;”[44] it stands as the Noah’s Ark
of sound-images where spaces and times overlap and interact
in a non-chronological and non-causal way. Godard’s
Histoire(s) du cinéma (1998) perfectly embodies this idea that
history finds its home in Cinema (picture 16).
 
8. Conclusion: the image-action in the age of the virtual
and the reality of the imaginal
According to Deleuze, because of the rupture of the sensory-
motor scheme of action we have lost our faculty to react,
emotionally or physically, to the external events affecting us.
The only connection between us and the world is faith.[45]
The body becomes the living testimony of an act of faith. Its
mode of existence is less a phenomenological incarnation in
the flesh than a gnostic resurrection in a figure of light. Unable
to act, it contemplates events affecting the world by trying to
convince itself that it is concerned directly with what is
happening.
However, this destruction of the sensory-motor scheme of
action does not put an end to action movies. On the contrary,
it provides action movies with a new opportunity to go beyond
the limits of the actual physical limits of empiric bodies. In
contemporary action movies, the body seems to be less and
less in touch with reality: invincible and unbreakable
(Shyamalan’s Unbreakable, 2000) or totally affranchised from
gravity (Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, 2000). In
The Matrix (1999), the body accomplishes the program of the
Marxist digital revolution by becoming the real owner of the
means of post-production. It organizes the “special effects”
affecting the world for its own gain. Exemplary of this trend is
Cameron’s Avatar (2009), where the “actual” human body of
the main hero suffers from the inability to walk, leading him to
choose to migrate into a “virtual,” superiorly apt and vigorous,
non-human body.
This mode of representation of the body in contemporary
actions movies provides the final clue to our understanding of
the nature of the ontological relation between image and body.
From a Platonist perspective, the body is a tomb or a trap we
need to move beyond. From a Cartesian perspective, the body
is a functional tool, a machine to which passions come from
the outside to tell us what is happening in any specific
situation. For Plato, the body is a symptom. For Descartes it is
a sign. But, for French phenomenology, it is proof of our
incarnation, our presence in this world, a presence that might
exceed our capacity to express it (existential ecstasy). For
Deleuze, the body is the surface onto which floats the
fragments of both individual and collective memories. If the
body is deprived of its faculty to act; as a purely reflective
entity, it becomes the passive vector of time. These different
conceptions of the body have different cinematographic
expressions that are not mere illustrations of a philosophical
thesis but literal translations into an imaginal reality.
Henry Corbin, a French historian of Sufism, has developed the
concept of the “imaginal world,” a world that stands between
the sensible world and the intelligible world.[46] The imaginal
world is the place where ideas come down to be incarnated
and where sensations rise up to be universalized. This median
place between ideas and sensations stands at the same
ontological level as does Bergson’s images that exist between
things and representations. In this respect, we shall say that
cinema is nothing but an exploration of this imaginal world.
Moreover, if we want to give to this proposition the highest
philosophical significance, it should be said that this imaginal
world is actually the only true world. The empirical world that
we call “real” is simply a degradation of this imaginal reality,
while the intelligible world is mainly an abstraction and a
schematization of this vivid and fluctuant realm of dancing
images.  
Thus, one should not, perhaps, consider the introduction of
virtual reality in cinematographic productions as the “death of
cinema” in its Godardian sense (“the cinema is truth twenty-
four times per second”). In my view, the realism of cinema
does not come from what it films but from how it films it. The
aesthetic experience delivered by movies depends on the
credibility of the narrative and not on the reality of the object.
What is real is, in the end, a matter of belief.
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